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*5th Integrated CNS Conference & Workshop*

**Communications-Supported Concepts for  
Highjacked Aircraft**

**Tom Mulkerin**

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**7405 Alban Station Ct., Suite B-201, Springfield, VA, 22150-2318, (703) 644-5660**

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- **Background**
  - **Presentation Focus & Concepts**
  - **Scenario**
  - **Communications Architecture**
  - **Aircraft/FAA & TSA Communications**
  - **Panic Button**
  - **Aircraft Video/Audio Surveillance**
  - **Remote Flight Plan Monitoring**
  - **Conclusion**
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- **Aviation security emphasis changed dramatically after September 11, 2001**
  - Context of threat has changed
  - Aircraft can be used as a weapon
  - Passengers became obstacles
- **Additional tools needed to deal with hijacking**
  - Increased emphasis on early detection of hostile takeover
  - Learn more about the hijackers and their intentions


- **Focus: Communications support for monitoring and reacting to activities on a hijacked commercial aircraft**
  - **Concepts discussed**
    - **Panic button to alert the ATC system, TSA and airline**
    - **Aircraft video and audio on demand to observe what is occurring on the aircraft**
    - **Automatic flight plan transmission to alert hijack response team of change in intended flight path**
  - **Implementation**
    - **Development of new equipment not required**
    - **New applications for existing equipment**
    - **Resulting in early implementation**
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- **ACME Air flight 123 en route from Boston to Atlanta**
    - **15 minutes after departure, hijackers break into cockpit**
    - **Pilot actuates panic button**
      - ◆ **ACARS message sent to FAA's ATCSCC**
      - ◆ **Synthesized voice message sent over current VHF voice radio**
      - ◆ **Digital Flight Data Recorder records transactions**
      - ◆ **DFDR starts to record all video/audio inputs from onboard cameras**
  - **ATCSCC Flight Data Processor (FDP) receives message**
    - **Display changed to notify ATCSCC watch personnel**
    - **FDP forwards message to TSA, ACME's AOC, and ARTCC responsible for aircraft**
  - **ATCSCC, TSA, ARTCC and AOC response team coordinate actions over landline voice circuit**
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- **Response team wants more information about hijackers and situation onboard the aircraft**
  - **Command sent via ACARS message to transmit video and audio from one of the cameras in the cockpit**
  - **Later commands sent to change to different cameras**
  - **Response team learns**
    - ◆ **6 hijackers onboard: 2 in cockpit and 4 in cabin**
    - ◆ **ACME's aircrew is still flying aircraft**


- **FAA's primary and secondary surveillance radars are continually updating aircraft's location**
  - **Response team wants to know hijackers' destination**
    - **Command sent to aircraft to transmit FMS flight plan**
    - **Shortly thereafter, aircraft transmits current flight plan**
    - **10 minutes later, aircraft automatically transmits revised flight plan**
    - **Flight plan indicates that aircraft will change course in 6 minutes and fly towards Washington, DC.**
  - **Applications and communications concepts employed will not end the hijacking. However,**
    - **FAA, TSA, airline and military personnel will gain information about the hijackers and their intent**
    - **Response team will have more useful information with which to develop a plan of action**
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# Communications Architecture





- **Uses existing applications and infrastructure to maximum extent reasonable**
    - **Least costly concepts are most likely to be accepted and funded => Implementation**
  - **Datalink media is VDL Mode 2**
    - **Airlines have or will soon equip to support ACARS and ATN applications**
  - **FAA ground network: NADIN II today and replaced by FTI as it comes online**
  - **ARINC and SITA networks have NADIN II interfaces and will interface with FTI**
  - **ARINC and SITA have existing ACARS systems used to exchange messages between aircraft, AOC, and FAA**
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- **Used by aircrew member to alert ATC, TSA and AOC of hijacking**
  - **Scripted ACARS message created and transmitted**
    - **Contains flight information (ID, location, status, etc.)**
    - **Sent to the ATCSCC via VDL-2 radio and ground network**
      - ◆ **ATCSCC will have predetermined static address for these messages**
    - **Using ACARS message takes advantage of existing ARINC and SITA infrastructures with gateways into FAA's NADIN II network**
  - **ATCSCC forwards message to TSA, AOC and ARTCC controlling aircraft**
  - **Synthesized voice message on current VHF ATC frequency**
    - **“Highjack, Highjack, Highjack < aircraft tail number>”**
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### ■ **Technical Issues**

- Use of panic button type message was demonstrated by ARINC at NASA's Glenn Research Center in Jan 02
- Automatically generating synthesized voice message over analog VHF radio occurs today (e.g., UNICOMM)

### ■ **Implementation, Feasibility, Scalability & Cost**

- Technology currently available for panic button generated ACARS message
  - No additional cost associated with transmission for ACARS equipped aircraft
  - Some cost associated with modifying ACARS software
  - Synthetic voice message from aircraft via VHF radio is low cost development effort
  - Datalink and voice concepts scale well
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- **Video and audio on demand could be initiated by ground control center (either ATC or TSA) via ACARS message**
    - **Message specifies camera used for transmission**
      - ◆ **Surveillance system could include cameras in cabin, cockpit and cargo bays**
    - **Initiating message uses authentication and encryption techniques**
  - **Pilot could initiate in response to a voice request from ATC**
  - **Cameras are linked to video/audio system controller that formats as streaming video for transmission**
    - **Streaming video encrypted**
      - ◆ **Intercepted video shown on national TV could alert hijackers that they are being monitored**
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## *Aircraft Video/Audio Surveillance*

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- **Video/audio controller interfaces through the CMU to VDL-2 radio**
- **If request initiated from ground, video sent to “from” address in ACARS message**
- **If pilot initiates, video sent to predetermined address at ATCSCC**
  - **ATCSCC distributes video to TSA and other organizations**

## ■ Technology Issues

- ARINC demonstrated technology for transmitting unencrypted video via VDL-2 from aircraft to ground station
- Demonstration showed that quality of video carried over VDL-2 needs improvement
  - ◆ VDL-2 throughput constrains number of transmitted frames per second
- Limited bandwidth results in transmission of images and sound from only one camera at a time
- Effective authentication and encryption mechanisms needed

- **Implementation, Feasibility, Scalability & Cost**
  - **VDL-2 radio in daily use by ARINC, SITA, and airlines for business communications between aircraft and company operations**
  - **VDL-2 is ACARS and ATN compliant**
  - **Configuring video transmission application to use existing radio and ground network is cost-effective solution**
  - **Using VDL-2 as communications media has best chance of implementation**
  - **Scalable solution since it can be deployed on multiple aircraft once it is developed**





## *Remote Flight Plan Monitoring*

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- **Flight Management System (FMS) maintains current flight plan onboard an aircraft**
    - **Flight plan is represented by series of 3-D waypoints and times when aircraft should be at each waypoint**
  - **Flight plan is entered prior to takeoff and can be modified by aircrew while airborne**
  - **Communications architecture provides means to send aircraft's flight plan to ground control center**
  - **When FAA/TSA/AOC hijack response team wants to know aircraft's intended flight path**
    - **Encrypted ACARS message sent via VDL-2 to aircraft's CMU**
    - **CMU authenticates that message came from FAA or TSA**
    - **CMU sends FMS an instruction to prepare message containing flight plan**
    - **Flight plan message prepared by FMS, encrypted by CMU and transmitted via VDL-2**
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## ■ **Technology Issues**

- **New ACARS messages would have to be developed to carry the flight plan request and response information**
- **Currently, ACARS messages are not digitally authenticated or encrypted. Such techniques would have to be developed.**

## ■ **Implementation, Feasibility, Scalability & Cost**

- **ACARS and VDL-2 radio are currently operational in commercial aircraft**
  - **Adding authentication and encryption capabilities would add cost to system**
  - **Scalable solution since it can be deployed on multiple aircraft once it is developed**
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- **Highjacking of commercial aircraft continues to be a potential threat to the United States**
  - **Dealing effectively with highjackings requires**
    - **Early detection**
    - **Knowledge about the hijackers and what they are doing onboard the aircraft**
    - **Knowledge about aircraft's location and intended flight path**
  - **Panic button, video/audio on demand, and flight plan transmissions concepts provide first responders in FAA, TSA and AOC with tools to more effectively deal with highjackings**
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## *Contact*

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### **Tom Mulkerin**

Mulkerin Associates Inc.

7405 Alban Station Ct., Suite B-201

Springfield, VA 22150-2318

(703) 644-5660

Tom.Mulkerin@Mulkerin.com